As back­ground read­ing for a book project, I have been work­ing through Lin­gua Fracta by Collin Gif­ford Brooke. I like this book alot because of its genre: it’s the type of the­o­ret­i­cal work I’ve been writ­ing recently.

One part in par­tic­u­lar has stood out as par­tic­u­larly use­ful so far: Brooke’s dis­cus­sion of rhetor­i­cal ecolo­gies. Brooke describes a rhetor­i­cal ecol­ogy by way of the clas­si­cal rhetor­i­cal canons: inven­tion, arrange­ment, style, mem­ory, deliv­ery. An inven­tion ecol­ogy, for exam­ple, is “a per­sonal sen­si­tiv­ity to the con­di­tions under which inven­tion takes place in my own writ­ing” (44).

It’s his exam­ple of an inven­tional ecol­ogy that drew my attention:

I attend a cou­ple of con­fer­ences per year and each time, start­ing about halfway through the con­fer­ence and extend­ing to as long as a week fol­low­ing my return trip home, I am a par­tic­u­larly pro­duc­tive writer. I sus­pect that many peo­ple share this expe­ri­ence .… When I began blog­ging, I noticed a shift in my per­cep­tions of the world around me.… Over time, the sub­tle oblig­a­tion of the weblog has some­times encour­aged me to write when oth­er­wise I would not” (44).

Although Brooke is writ­ing largely about social con­ven­tions affect­ing the writ­ing process, I couldn’t help but think of a Howard Becker book (Art Worlds) in which he explores the infra­struc­ture of musi­cal con­certs. The typ­i­cal con­cert lasts about three hours and sys­tem­atic depen­den­cies like con­cert labor, park­ing space, and occu­pant spaces become hope­lessly entwined into that 3 hour time period. The odds of being able to run an eight-hour con­cert must work against a slew of pre­con­fig­ured and embed­ded con­ven­tions of prac­tice. The time of the con­cert, once estab­lished, lit­er­ally becomes infra­struc­tured into the social prac­tice of the con­cert. When these con­ven­tions become embed­ded within tech­ni­cal sys­tems, this infra­struc­tur­ing process becomes sig­nif­i­cantly more complex.

Mate­r­ial objects are built because of social con­ven­tion but then push back and solid­ify con­ven­tion (ANT the­o­rists will be yawn­ing at how rudi­men­tary that seems). Get­ting back to Brooke and his book, the thing I find inter­est­ing about rhetor­i­cal ecolo­gies is the infra­struc­ture involved in each. Yes, to some extent rhetor­i­cal ecolo­gies are dynamic, but they also con­sist of infra­struc­tured, mate­r­ial tech­nolo­gies. Just to begin think­ing about blog­ging, it seems that one part of the struc­tured ecol­ogy the HTML form field that is used in many con­tent man­age­ment sys­tems as a way to shut­tle text to the server. The inter­face pro­vides an easy way to write a ton of text, but it resists com­pos­ing with some­thing more like a mind map­ping piece of soft­ware. This is to say that it’s hard to doo­dle with bub­bles in a blog. I need to think a lit­tle bit more about this, but stan­dard­ized com­po­nents pro­vide resis­tance to writ­ing and rhetoric.

This is all just a long way of say­ing that I’m find­ing a lot I like about Brooke’s book. It’s smart, and I see some great places to add infra­struc­tural the­ory to his con­cep­tion of rhetoric.

Day, Ronald E. “Death of the User: Recon­cep­tu­al­iz­ing Sub­jects, Objects, and Their Rela­tions.” Jour­nal of the Amer­i­can Soci­ety for Infor­ma­tion Sci­ence and Tech­nol­ogy 62, no. 1 (2011): 78–88.

Ron Day writes for JASIST alot.  His work devel­ops crit­i­cal the­ory in a jour­nal that is largely devoted to empir­i­cal social sci­ence. I have a con­flicted rela­tion­ship with most of his work that ends up in JASIST. Ron is super intel­li­gent, but the gen­eral audi­ence he ends up writ­ing for works from a very dif­fer­ent the­o­ret­i­cal per­spec­tive. This is great on the one hand because it gen­er­ates arti­cles that are acces­si­ble to a num­ber of dif­fer­ing per­spec­tives. But on the other hand, it also leads to some strange pas­sages that seem out of place because they read like direct responses to a peer reviewer–kind of like a short one-on-one Q & A ses­sion in the mid­dle of an arti­cle. Case in point:

… the method of this arti­cle requires expla­na­tion. One charge against it may be that the arti­cle involves intel­lec­tual brico­lage. This is true.

Any­way, this par­tic­u­lar arti­cle ana­lyzes the con­cept of the user in sev­eral the­o­ries cen­tral to Library & Infor­ma­tion Sci­ence, most notably Nick Belkin’s Anom­alous States of Knowl­edge (ASK). My inter­est with this arti­cle had to do with Day’s use of Lacan­ian psy­cho­analy­sis as a way to cri­tique “the infor­ma­tion user.” I’ve been work­ing on a sim­i­lar topic for  under­stand­ing infor­ma­tion architecture.

One of the most impor­tant sec­tions of this essay, at least for LIS, is Day’s expla­na­tion of Lacan­ian theory.

It is not at all the inten­tion of this sec­tion or this arti­cle to pro­pose psy­cho­analy­sis as a new ‘approach’ for empir­i­cal analy­sis, but rather, to exam­ine the con­struc­tion of the sub­ject within psy­cho­analy­sis, par­tic­u­larly, Lacan­ian psy­cho­analy­sis, as a bridge between the LIS user model—based on need—and a fuller and more pre­cise the­o­ret­i­cal, socio­cul­tural model. (82)

It seems to me that resis­tance to crit­i­cal approaches within LIS has often under­stood crit­i­cal the­ory as con­struct­ing empir­i­cal the­ory. This con­fu­sion has drawn cri­tique which argues that the crit­i­cal the­ory is a poor model for empir­i­cal infor­ma­tion behav­ior, and not with­out war­rant. Absolutely!

The issue here is that crit­i­cal the­ory does some­thing very dif­fer­ent than empir­i­cal the­ory. The con­fu­sion of the two approaches in LIS doesn’t seem pro­duc­tive, and it’s nice to see Day clearly say that crit­i­cal the­ory doesn’t nec­es­sar­ily pro­vide a model for empir­i­cal analy­sis. I should point out, that I think this the­o­ret­i­cal con­fu­sion is pri­mar­ily due to the dif­fer­ent the­o­ret­i­cal worlds that var­i­ous LIS schol­ars tend to approach their work with. One of the most use­ful exer­cises I did in grad school was to try and place the work of dif­fer­ent LIS aca­d­e­mics onto a spec­trum of research approaches. Although the exer­cise was nec­es­sar­ily reduc­tive, it was also a use­ful tool for under­stand­ing why peo­ple that seem to dis­agree with each other are dif­fer­ent. (Thanks to both Kristin Eschen­felder and Steve Pal­ing for ask­ing me to do those exer­cises!) Dif­fer­ences in cog­ni­tive frames make dis­ci­pli­nary dis­cus­sion pri­mar­ily dif­fi­cult at the the­o­ret­i­cal level.

One of the great things about this arti­cle is that it is a descrip­tive romp through Lacan­ian psy­cho­an­a­lytic con­cepts, dis­cur­sive psy­chol­ogy, and quasi-objects in the tra­di­tion of Ser­res and Latour. From my point of view, this is great: Day does some pow­er­ful work sum­ma­riz­ing dense con­cepts. The arti­cle isn’t a quick read, but because of its brevity and pub­li­ca­tion venue, it should be acces­si­ble to those who don’t fol­low the the­o­rists that Day describes.

The one thing I’m unsat­is­fied with, though, is that Day doesn’t ever get around to really cri­tiquing the information-seeking mod­els he men­tions. He sug­gests that the other information-seeking mod­els par­tic­i­pate in a folk psy­chol­ogy and mech­a­nis­tic view of infor­ma­tion behav­ior, but that’s the extent of cri­tique. It’s a lit­tle unsat­is­fy­ing to have the infor­ma­tion behav­ior lit­er­a­ture treated as if it is largely the same. (I should say that in a few places Day says that not all infor­ma­tion behav­ior mod­els have the same prob­lems he addresses, but that many do.) Maybe it’s just my per­sonal pref­er­ence as a rhetor­i­cal critic, but I wanted to see more cri­tique of a model like ASK (hope­fully con­tem­po­rary uses of ASK!) after the lengthy the­o­ret­i­cal description.

One rea­son I want to see that type of cri­tique: it seems to me that an infor­ma­tion behav­ior researcher’s eas­i­est appeal would be that they don’t actu­ally use the infor­ma­tion behav­ior mod­els in the way that Day sug­gests. So give them an exam­ple of how they do! (A hedge here: this paper came out of a con­fer­ence panel — per­haps a cri­tique wasn’t added­be­cause there was a very obvi­ous real dis­agree­ment dur­ing the panel. If that is the case, per­haps the peo­ple that Day is writ­ing for don’t need exam­ples of how they are using infor­ma­tion behav­ior mod­els mech­a­nis­ti­cally. Per­haps they were look­ing for a well-written descrip­tion of Day’s POV?) I guess my pri­mary con­cern is for Day to demon­strate that the tar­get of his cri­tique is legit­i­mately a con­tem­po­rary issue.

For my own work, I found his recap of imaginary/symbolic orders, affect, part-objects, and quasi-objects use­ful for fur­ther think­ing about stan­dards, clas­si­fi­ca­tions, and infor­ma­tion infra­struc­ture. Tech­ni­cal stan­dards, stan­dards doc­u­ments, clas­si­fi­ca­tion sys­tems, and the peo­ple inter­act­ing with them can be cri­tiqued with those con­cepts. Some­times it’s nice to have a well-written reminder of dense the­ory. Day does a nice job of that with this article.

UPDATE: Just a few notes after think­ing about this arti­cle a bit more.

Day’s dis­cus­sion about dif­fer­ences between sub­jects and iden­ti­ties is a use­ful dis­cus­sion for enrich­ing infor­ma­tion behav­ior stud­ies. Day puts it bet­ter than I could as he writes that in his under­stand­ing of the world includes  “the expres­sion and emer­gence of bod­ies, par­tic­u­larly sub­jects, as sin­gu­lar­i­ties, and then only later—through the over­lay of rep­re­sen­ta­tional cat­e­gories of recog­ni­tion and even classification—their being named as iden­ti­ties” (79: Check out the pas­sages around that area if you want to know more. It’s a good set of passages.) As far as I know, I hadn’t seen this dif­fer­ence men­tioned in the LIS lit­er­a­ture before. I hope it gets fur­ther explored in user studies.

Day’s con­cept of dou­ble medi­a­tion is also quite good. He describes a way of think­ing about infor­ma­tion behav­ior in terms of two axes. The first is a social/cultural/historical axis. That is, a way of under­stand­ing how a per­son is sit­u­ated within con­texts that afford their abil­ity to act in the world. The sec­ond axis, which I’m still think­ing about, he describes with heavy-handed term affect (I say heavy-handed, because this term has really taken off every­where. It’s hard to keep track of how it’s being used). He uses Deleuze and Guatarri’s writ­ing to talk about affect. By affect, he seems to mean the ways that bod­ies move through and inter­act in phys­i­cal space. The rea­son this part of his dis­cus­sion isn’t quite clear to me is because I’m try­ing to fig­ure out how to con­cep­tu­al­ize both axes together. It’s hard to focus on one axis with­out los­ing focus of the other.

Day describes the ideas he puts forth in this arti­cle as for­mal cau­sa­tion. I know this term has some dis­ci­pli­nary lever­age else­where, but I think that, at least within LIS, it would be use­ful to find a dif­fer­ent term to describe the same idea. For­mal cau­sa­tion, as a term, is a speed bump for me. I have to stop and think about it every time I see it. Because it’s con­cep­tu­ally related to mech­a­nis­tic cau­sa­tion, it also isn’t very cor­dial about the ways that it sug­gests other approaches to schol­ar­ship. There needs to be a bet­ter way to get at the same set of ideas.

One last thought: this arti­cle reminds me a lot of Josh Gunn’s “Refit­ting Fan­tasy” from a 1994 issue of the Quar­terly Jour­nal of Speech. Like Day, much of Gunn’s writ­ing is devoted to sketch­ing out con­cepts for an audi­ence that may be resis­tant to the ideas from Lacan (and in Gunn’s case, Slavoj Žižek). One rea­son that both are good arti­cles is because each author stretches to bring a extradis­ci­pli­nary ideas into the main­stream of their own discipline.

Bowker, Geof­frey C. “Time, Money, and Bio­di­ver­sity.” In Global Assem­blages: Tech­nol­ogy, Pol­i­tics, and Ethics as Anthro­po­log­i­cal Prob­lems, edited by John D. Kelly, Beat­rice Jau­regui, Sean T. Mitchell, and Jeremy Wal­ton, 107–123. Malden, MA: Black­well, 2005.

Geoff Bowker is a fas­ci­nat­ing per­son to read. In his writ­ing, he con­sis­tently tran­si­tions from his­tor­i­cal analy­sis to crit­i­cal the­ory, which makes him both a plea­sure to read and frus­trat­ing as hell. At some points, his books are com­pletely lucid, and then they’ll throw in an aside, foot­note, or sin­gle sen­tence that seems com­pletely inde­ci­pher­able. It’s awe­some, because he draws read­ers in and then makes them think really hard.

This chap­ter from the Global Assem­blages col­lec­tion (I believe it also informs much of his book Mem­ory Prac­tices in the Sci­ences, too) is largely about bio­di­ver­sity and eco­log­i­cal pol­icy, but the parts that are most intrigu­ing are his dis­cus­sions about modal­i­ties for deal­ing with bio­di­ver­sity: essen­tially, the the­ory behind the research.  By modal­ity, I’m assum­ing he is talk­ing about sig­nif­i­cant crit­i­cal points for under­stand­ing bio­di­ver­sity and related infra­struc­tures. Because he’s inter­ested in com­plex infor­ma­tional ecosys­tems that are clas­si­fied and stan­dard­ized by biol­o­gists, ecol­o­gists, etc, etc, this paper dove­tails well with his other writ­ing on infor­ma­tion infrastructure.

He describes two modal­i­ties that are typ­i­cally used for talk­ing about bio­di­ver­sity. The first he calls implo­sion, which I’ll focus on here. (In case you’re curi­ous, the sec­ond is clas­si­fi­ca­tion and tax­on­omy, which means mak­ing huge lists and hier­ar­chies to cat­a­log all types of flora and fauna). Implo­sion describes a way of assign­ing value to ecosys­tems and ecosys­tem com­po­nents. Implo­sion involves cre­at­ing some­thing akin to a cur­rency for talk­ing about bio­di­ver­sity. If you’re famil­iar with the car­bon trad­ing con­cept, it seems that the same form of dis­course is used to assign value for bio­di­ver­sity. Bowker explains implo­sion by using money as a metaphor. In Bowker’s descrip­tion, sci­en­tists come up with a cur­rency that will enable exchange among dif­fer­ent parts of ecosys­tems. Implo­sion works by pro­ject­ing a cer­tain type of value across dif­fer­ent things and sug­gest­ing that those things are actu­ally sim­i­lar (or at least focus­ing on one sim­i­lar aspect). For instance, sug­gest­ing that tiger is worth more than that flea, for exam­ple, because the num­ber of species of fleas far out­num­ber that of felines.  If a flea species goes away, it’s not as impor­tant as if pan­thera tigris dis­ap­pears. After all, we have dozens of sim­i­lar flea species and not nearly as many tigers.  Ecosys­tems are reduced to exchange. (This exam­ple was hypo­thet­i­cal — don’t quote me on it).

Clearly, there are some issues with this. For one, how would one talk about the fact that a cer­tain flea species might have a sym­bi­otic rela­tion­ship with the tiger and that allow­ing habi­tats of that flea species to be altered would sig­nif­i­cantly alter the tiger species. What if a less valu­able ecosys­tem part actu­ally enables things that would seem more valu­able. Sec­ond, how can a value exchange rate deal with the con­cept of time? Species emerge and die off fre­quently. Can a value exchange rate han­dle talk­ing about bio­di­ver­sity in terms of time, evo­lu­tion, or species adap­tion? Last, and maybe most sig­nif­i­cantly, to assign value to ecosys­tem parts simul­ta­ne­ously cre­ates a self/other rela­tion­ship with nature. Are humans left out of dis­cus­sions of value? Do we have a value as well? Does that include all types of humans? If so, do we label our­selves as the most valu­able part of ecosys­tems? Why?

The most inter­est­ing part of this chap­ter for me was when he dis­cussed how peo­ple con­sid­ered indige­nous will often be swept up into the dis­course as the other side of a self/other binary. That is, in the lan­guage of value and bio­di­ver­sity, some peo­ple are less “human” and more “nature” than oth­ers. Fas­ci­nat­ing and scary at the same time.

Bowker does an awe­some job of show­ing the real world impli­ca­tions of implo­sion for bio­di­ver­sity dis­course, but this is also an inter­est­ing way to think about a huge num­ber of other infor­ma­tion infra­struc­tures. For exam­ple, the con­cept of implo­sion could work well for think­ing about tech­ni­cal stan­dard­iza­tion of con­tem­po­rary tech­nolo­gies. Tech­ni­cal stan­dards work to flat­ten real world dif­fer­ences into one value exchange rate. Even tech­ni­cal doc­u­ments like those of the W3C and ISO, despite their usu­ally utopian claims for a bet­ter tomor­row, embed pri­or­i­ties and val­ues that do work to dis­em­power some groups, objects, and ecolo­gies. (Patrick Feng wrote a good overview of stan­dards — check it out). Bowker’s chap­ter is a great read.